At a Hypothetical Bar, Attempting to Describe Digital Humanities in My Own Words

So, from what I’ve been able to gather from our first, introductory readings—in an attempt to test my own ability to describe Digital Humanities (DH) if I were, say, asked about it by an enthusiastic stranger at a bar—is as follows:

Digital Humanities is a field of study devoted to the methodology of not only utilizing digital methods for instruction and research in the field of humanities, but in fact, it extends well beyond that to also involve the practice of using these digital methods of research to contribute one’s own explorations of the humanities via personal or group-initiated digital humanities projects.

“What are these methods?” the stranger might ask, if they aren’t already talking to someone else.

Well, that I’m not one-hundred percent sure on, yet. First, it’s important to emphasize that all the methods are means to serve that greater “methodology.” Which is to say, the purpose of the Digital Humanities. Which is, like I’ve been getting at, both to use technology to explore the humanities to a greater depth than we’ve ever seen, learn from it, and equally as importantly, to archive, preserve, and develop that information digitally. The methodology, which is developing at the same speed as a newborn Buffalo, seems to feed off of the development and understanding of its methods. Which makes the effectiveness and employment of these methods incredibly significant to attend to and track, in addition to the results they produce.

“I hope I’m not convoluting anything,” I might say.

“No. This is fascinating. In fact, I want to come home with you,” the stranger might reply, before urging me to continue.

I am much less familiar with the “methods,” because I’ve only developed an idea of what exactly DH is in the last several hours. I can, however, refer you to multiple websites containing a plethora of tools for digital research. I just need to consult my course syllabus, because I’ve yet to commit them to memory. I think one is “methodica?”

I also have a feeling that traditional research strategies, or at the very least, the innate curiosity humans possess, also makes its way into Digital Humanists’ processes. Though, because I’ve never taken a serious interest in making new literary research discoveries, I don’t think I can elaborate much further on these things either.

So I’m left, still, with questions. Where do Digital Humanities project initiatives come from? Just anywhere? Wherever there’s funding? Both? Is the focus solely on text(s)? If so, why? How do we differentiate DH projects from, say, an art exhibit that compiles the work of many valued artists and then alters it into a new, cohesive, digital form? Even further, is a dance album by a mash-up artist like Greg Gillis, a.k.a. “Girl Talk” considered a Digital Humanities project? Or rather, are the digital humanists just the people behind the scenes, digitizing old, analog recordings to ensure their longevity? Are those people digital humanists at all?

“I’m beginning to enjoy these ideas,” I might conclude, “but still, my DH brain feels only semi-conscious, and, I don’t think it’s just the eggnog.”

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Primarily in response to Rieder and Rohle; Ch.4, Digital Methods

In response to the first issues presented by the implications of “mechanical objectivity,” it is apparent to me that balance between technological tools and human manipulation/interpretation is absolutely crucial. As stated, machines provide incredibly useful tools for rapid data collection and organization. Such “mathematical”/ “scientific” data collected by the machine/tool should epitomize objectivity because they seem to be numerically based.

However, what to do with this data? It must be interpreted and organized to accommodate the researcher’s methodology, and only the researcher must decide how to then utilize that information to meet their needs. The tool, if used effectively/successfully by the researcher should provide the collection of data, and the researcher is then responsible for assessing and utilizing it in a meaningful manner. Just as numbers and science may provide blunt facts and tendencies, humanists give those facts and tendencies meaning.

It is also important to acknowledge the age of this material, and consider it in relation to what we know about the fragile integrity of online research tools, software, and filtration. What additional responsibilities do these considerations place on us as digital humanists/ researchers?

If it is theory/methodology that determines method, does that methodology also determine the depth to which a digital humanist seeks to understand their method for any given project? For example, if a person is to call themselves a digital humanist, but does not know how to code and instead uses a platform like Shopify or WordPress to create a project, does that suggest that their methodology is tolerant of the issues inherent in their method because it accepts whatever consequences that may arise as a result of those issues? And consequently, what does that do for the validity of their project? Is that project limited or pigeon-holed because of its loose methodology, or would transparency of the tolerance for a potentially “bias” or “flawed” method validate its use?

I agree completely with the idea that it is the responsibility of the researcher (or whoever is undertaking a digital humanities project) to understand their tools. Just as any professional carpenter should have an understanding of how to use saws, or a poet to use form, a digital humanist should master the tools of their trade. But what limitations does this set for those who do not code? If a digital humanist has incredible talents and knowledge of an inherently flawed/biased tool/software, what responsibilities do they have to account for this? Should they use a disclaimer, utilize the tool in a manner that is unaffected by its bias/flaw, or do they abandon the flawed tool and take it upon themselves to either find or create a new one?

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Ramsay’s Discussion of Oulipo (among other things)

Some initial things from Chapter One that I found to be fascinating, research-based concepts that support incredibly informed interpretation (but “interpretation” nonetheless):

  • Understanding the meaning of the author’s verbal system in order to truly understand what they are suggesting. … Is this “verbal system” something based on how the constraints of the author’s language shaped their work, or is it something discovered more algorithmically based on a reorganization of text to see the frequency of certain word appearances?
  • “We “measure” only to establish webs of interrelation and influence.” … This further enforces for me the compatibility of algorithmic criticism and literary criticism.

…

Now, into Chapter 2 …

What is Ramsay attempting to do here? Prove the existence of the pataphysical world? But for what reason?

For help, I looked up pataphysics, defined as:

“n. (used with a singular verb) The French absurdist concept of a philosophy or science dedicated to studying what lies beyond the realm of metaphysics, intended as a parody of the methods and theories of modern science and often expressed in nonsensical language.”

Is the majority of Ramsay’s chapter based on a parody of science? Really?

He goes on to make the suggestion that, because reality never reveals its complete truth, “it leaves itself open to thousands of interpretations.” Consequently making interpretation an inherent characteristic of anything that exists in reality (which is both humanities and science!).

…

In response to the Oulipo, it would make since that the validity or value of algorithmic research would be driven home for me through an example from poetry. I think there are many facets to the value (and lack thereof) of that work. To the question of whether or not the Oulipo achieves poetic effectiveness, via resonance or the creation of mood stored within the “bodily synapses of the reader” (in poet Gregory Orr’s words), I guess that is a subject for long debate. Perhaps, out of the trillion sonnets, probability suggests that one or more of those poems would actually offer something to the reader that elicited the ineffable response in them so characteristic of a beautiful poem. However, how long would they read before they gave up looking?

The value of the Oulipo is not necessarily traditionally poetic. The sonnets themselves and the methods used to create  them (which may not be “haphazard” but still lack a certain, human emotional investment) are not  particularly resonant, but the Oulipo’s display of the incredible possibilities within the constraints of one form is suggestive of the incredible poetics of reality—that the “reality” in which we live is the strict form, which contains infinite possibilities and interpretations. The algorithm, then, appears to be valuable to me in this way—that it, in fact, further reinforces the inherent debate and interpretive genetics of the humanities. Certainly, if there are endless possibilities, there become even fewer opportunities to find “answers.”

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Conventions of the Selfie and Humanistic Study

Is something still a “Selfie” if taken by a third party? The devil’s advocate, Seinfeldian aspect of my personality thinks that that’s bullshit. The reading makes clear that a “Selfie” can be deemed as such less so on the basis of the physical action of taking a picture of one’s self, but on “the conventions of framing associated with the intimacy and alienation of the genre” (Losh). I guess these conventions are things like available filters, body positions, clothing choices, facial expressions, mirror use, facial distance, etc. that provide psychological hints towards personal emotion/status. Some other conventions that are certainly important and unique to the selfie are the #me and #selfie text-incorporations that allow selfies to move beyond the individual into that larger category, as stated by Hochman:

            The result of these new organizational forms for visual information is the re-    condition of the terms under which text, images and numbers come together and relate to each other. Words (such as tags) or numbers (such as location indication, or time) are not meant to explicate an image (as an indexical sign) but rather to group it with all other images that share data similarity.

I’m very interested in the relationship between the various forms of self-portrait. Obviously, there are certain characteristics of self-portraits across all genres that are similar, but what further significance can be drawn about the human condition if we were to incorporate self-portraits from other mediums (painting, drawing, professional photography, film, etc.) into the Selfiecity image plots or study? Is there enough of a correlation between them all to spend time investigating that, or is the incorporation of other mediums’ conventions (techniques, materials, and mastery of skill) too complex and different to consider alongside the conventions of selfies? Of course, the same psychological expressions are occurring and being conveyed, but in today’s selfie, perhaps this is being done with considerably less thought, time, effort.

It calls to mind the idea of accessibility. There was a time, it seems, that only artists—or those with artmaking materials—had access to explore the personal, psychologically developing experience of the self-portrait. They had to understand themselves, in a sense, to be able to recreate their features using their chosen medium. Really, there was more room for subjectivity in the self-portrait before photography.

And, in fact, there still is subjectivity in the form of body/pose manipulation and image editing. But, as is the entire Selfiecity project, the conventions of the selfie genre carry a certain level of inherent objectivity that, in general, can be used even more accurately to understand the human condition, our behaviors, motivations and selves.

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Responding to: Debates in the Digital Humanities; Humanities Approaches to Graphical Display

I take these principles to be, first, that the humanities are committed to the concept of knowledge as interpretation, and, second, that the apprehension of the phenomena of the physical, social, cultural world is through constructed and constitutive acts, not mechanistic or naturalistic realist representations of pre-existing or self-evident information. Nothing in intellectual life is self-evident or self-identical, nothing in cultural life is mere fact, and nothing in the phenomenal world gives rise to a record of representation except through constructed expressions. The rhetorical force of graphical display is too important a field for its design to be adopted without critical scrutiny and the full force of theoretical insight.

^I agree with this in the sense that I obviously agree with the idea that any trusted information must be vetted and critiqued until it presents the most accurate representation of its material. I also appreciate the epistemological statement, framing the humanities as an committed to “knowledge as interpretation” because this sets clear ground rules for this discussion. However, I question the leeway for “interpretation” when discussing elements of Geography like on Google Maps. How “interpretive” could geography, mapping, and global position be when it is usually reduced to numbers and measurements? What is the interpretive role in it?

…

Drucker defines Capta as “‘taken’ actively while data is assumed to be a ‘given’ able to be recorded and observed. … Data are considered objective ‘information’ while capta is information that is captured because it conforms to the rules and hypothesis set for the experiment.”

 … the rendering of statistical information into graphical form gives it a simplicity and  legibility that hides every aspect of the original interpretative framework on which the statistical data were constructed…

The point I’m making is that the basic categories of supposedly quantitative information, the fundamental parameters of chart production, are already interpreted expressions. But they do not present themselves as categories of interpretation, riven with ambiguity   and uncertainty, because of the representational force of the visualization as a “picture”      of “data”.

All metrics are metrics about something for some purpose.

^Does this consequently make the “data” that they represent not “data” at all, but instead “capta?”

I think my favorite thing, consistently, about all of our DH discussions/readings is the framing of science, or most (if not all) scientific methods, as interpreted rather than (as scientists believe) merely observed. I certainly agree with this, in the sense that, every “observation” contains implications, which are inherently derived from interpretation. And every observation, when assigned meaning, thus becomes an interpretation.

…

Essentially, what I’m understanding from this discussion makes me wonder: are humanists simply adapting graphic representation of knowledge because pictures—regardless of how inapplicable a graph might seem to a text analysis—sometimes make the findings they are trying to discuss appeal differently to a reader? Out of context, of course, these graphics seem much more nonsensical than the typical percentage pie chart or graph. However, I do agree with the overall idea that humanistic interpretation is under-represented in popular graphical imagery, and I’m fascinated by the thought of being able to linguistically deconstruct every captain-derived “truth” into a mere interpretation of the phenomenal world.

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